William & Mary Law Review
Volume 36 (1994-1995)
Issue 3

Article 5

March 1995

Preventing Predatory Abuses in Litigation Between Business
Competitors: Focusing on a Litigant's Reasons for Initiating the
Litigation to Ensure a Balance Between the Constitutional Right to
Petition and the Sherman Act's Guarantee of Fair Competition in
Business
Scott D. Helsel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Repository Citation
Scott D. Helsel, Preventing Predatory Abuses in Litigation Between Business Competitors:
Focusing on a Litigant's Reasons for Initiating the Litigation to Ensure a Balance Between the
Constitutional Right to Petition and the Sherman Act's Guarantee of Fair Competition in
Business, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1135 (1995), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/
5
Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

NOTES
PREVENTING PREDATORY ABUSES IN LITIGATION
BETWEEN BUSINESS COMPETITORS: FOCUSING ON A
LITIGANT'S REASONS FOR INITIATING THE LITIGATION
TO ENSURE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PETITION AND THE
SHERMAN ACTS GUARANTEE OF FAIR COMPETITION IN
BUSINESS
As lawyers we know that it is not uncommon for parties to
commercial litigation (even some who win) to be motivated to
file their actions, not by the prospect of winning, but by the
harassment value of the litigation.'
Widgets International, Inc. (Widgets) has experienced a long
period of success, commanding an overwhelmingly strong percentage of its product's market share. Every business day,
Widgets solidifies its position in the market and protects itself
against entry from other competitors. Eventually, however, a
small company, Gizmo Technologies, Inc. (Gizmo) decides to
attempt to enter the market and compete with Widgets. Gizmo's
product is innovative, and genuine competition seems possible.
How should Widgets counter such an entry?
Widgets may seek to use litigation and the courts as a predatory weapon.' By initiating litigation, Widgets can expect, regardless of the merits of the litigation, to cause Gizmo to incur
great expense in defending the suit, to tie up Gizmo's entrepreneurial resources, and to scare away investors or customers who
might otherwise find the new venture attractive.' In fact, if

1. Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1986) (Merritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035 (1987).
2. The use of litigation as a predatory weapon is not limited to Widgets. Litigation also may serve as a viable strategy for Gizmo.
3. Joel R. Bennett & Maxwell M. Blecher, Litigation as an Integral Part of a
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Widgets has a significant capital advantage over Gizmo, the
merits of the litigation may become irrelevant; just defending
the suit will make the new venture so expensive that Gizmo
may abandon its efforts to enter the market.4 Gizmo may fold
before a court can even rule on the issues of the litigation.'
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act "in response to
strong public fear of and hostility against monopolistic combinations and their anticompetitive business practices."6 The
Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations... ."7
The Act also prohibits all "attempt[s] to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations ... ."' At least under the terms of the Act, the
predatory use of litigation would seem to violate the Sherman
Act insofar as such litigation restrains trade protected by the
Act.
Unlike other activity prohibited by the Sherman Act,9 however, the right of access to the courts is protected by the First
Amendment's right to petition."l Accordingly, courts must balance the interests of litigants in bringing their grievances before
a court with Congress' interest in providing for free competition
in interstate commerce. In establishing this balance, the Su-

Scheme To Create or Maintain an Illegal Monopoly, 26 MERCER L. REV. 479, 480
(1975).
4. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d
Cir.) (Frank, J., concurring), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942)).
5. Other examples of the predatory use of litigation exist and are explored elsewhere in this Note. The Gizmo example has been selected only because it illustrates
the potential harms that litigation poses to free and unfettered entry into the marketplace.
6. 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §
2.0111] (1994).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1992).
8. Id. § 2.
9. More traditional behaviors prohibited by the Sherman Act are price-fixing,
refusals to deal, exclusive arrangements and vertical restraints, some mergers, and
monopolizations and attempts to monopolize. See 2 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAW chs. 9-14 (1980).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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preme Court has created the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
clearly favors the constitutional right to petition.1
The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine generally immunizes a litigant
from antitrust liability predicated on his decision to initiate litigation against a competitor. 2 Nevertheless, this immunity is
not absolute; the doctrine's sham exception may create liability
when the decision to litigate merely masks the litigant's desire
"to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor .... ."", Determining just when the sham exception should

create antitrust liability, however, has proven very difficult for
the courts. At the heart of this determination is the courts'
struggle
to define when litigation becomes predatory or "un14
fair."
The Supreme Court recently attempted to end this difficulty.
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc., 5 the Court announced a clear, two-part test for
determining when litigation should be labeled predatory, thereby creating antitrust liability. 6 Under this new standard, in
order to serve as the basis of liability under the sham exception,
a court first must find as a matter of law that the lawsuit is
"objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits." 7 If the court
so determines, then the court must "focus on whether the...
lawsuit conceals 'an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.""' Only after the antitrust
plaintiff wins on these two issues is she allowed to proceed to
prove the elements of the substantive antitrust claim. 9

11. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine was established by the Court's decisions in
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
12. See infra notes 81-116 and accompanying text.
13. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. Noerr is discussed extensively infra notes 81-97 and
accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.

15. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
16. Id. at 1928-29.
17. Id. at 1928.

18. Id. (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
19. Id. at 1928.
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Although potentially eliminating some confusion in determining whether litigation is predatory, the Court's decision effectively rendered it impossible to prevent parties from using "meritorious litigation"2 for improper purposes. In limiting the judicial system's ability to control parties who initiate litigation for
reasons other than success on the merits, the Supreme Court in
Columbia Pictures potentially curtailed the market protections
created by the Sherman Act.
This Note argues that meritorious litigation brought for an
improper purpose should be the basis for antitrust liability under the Sherman Act. In so arguing, this Note suggests that
lower courts should apply Columbia Pictures only after finding
that the litigation, if successful, would affect the competitive
relationship between the litigants. When such a finding is not
possible-that is, when the process of litigation, rather than its
outcome, is used to affect the competitive relationship between
the parties-courts should allow the injured party to proceed
with proving a substantive violation of the Sherman Act.
This Note first discusses the Court's decision in Columbia
Pictures, explaining the Court's current definition of the sham
exception when applied to predatory litigation. This Note then
outlines the potential harms of predatory litigation-exploring
the balance between the substantive goals of the Sherman Act
and the constitutional protection of the First Amendment's right
to petition-to conclude that the protection of the Sherman Act
should be construed broadly and that the First Amendment's
right of petition should not be interpreted to provide absolute
immunity for meritorious litigation brought for an improper
purpose.
This Note proceeds with an interpretation of the development
of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to suggest that the Court's case
law indicates an analysis that this Note labels the "direct purpose/incidental effect" analysis. Under this analysis, the critical
inquiry for courts in determining antitrust liability of meritorious litigation is whether the initiating party sought to harm its
competitor through the outcome of the litigation or through the

20. For the purposes of this Note, "meritorious litigation" means litigation that is
not objectively baseless as defined in Columbia Pictures. See id.

1995]

PREVENTING PREDATORY LITIGATION

1139

process of litigation. Finally, this Note suggests that courts
should adopt the direct purpose/incidental effect analysis. This
discussion concedes several problems with the analysis-namely,
the courts' hesitancy to litigate the merits and motivations associated with past litigation. Clearly, however, less draconian
measures exist for preventing injustice and inefficiency than
those the Court presented in its opinion in Columbia Pictures.
PROFESSIONAL

V. COLUMBIA
REAL ESTATE INVESTORS
21
PICTURES

In Columbia Pictures, the Court announced a two-part test to
determine when litigation activity will be immune from antitrust liability. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. (PREI) competed against each
other for the business of providing movie entertainment to hotel
patrons through in-room service.22 Columbia Pictures began as
a copyright complaint brought by Columbia Pictures against
PREI, a suit that PREI ultimately wonY
In response to Columbia Pictures' complaint, PREI filed a
counterclaim, charging Columbia Pictures with violations of sec-

21. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
22. PREI operated La Mancha Private Club and Villas in Palm Springs, California. Id. at 1923. PREI installed a videodisc player in each room and assembled a
videodisc library of over 200 titles, available for rent to each visitor at the hotel. Id.
PREI also attempted to create a market for selling videodisc players to other hotels.
Id.
Columbia Pictures held the copyrights to the discs in PREI's library. Id. As
well, Columbia Pictures licensed the transmission of its copyrighted movies to hotel
rooms through Spectradyne, a wired cable system. Id. In the words of the Court,
'PRE[I] . . . competed with Columbia not only for the viewing market at La Mancha
but also for the broader market for in-room entertainment services in hotels." Id.
23. Columbia Pictures' suit focused on the rental of videodiscs to which Columbia
Pictures owned the copyright. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc., No. 83-2594 WPG, 1986 WL 32729 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1986).
The district court entered summary judgment in PREI's favor, holding that "such
rental did not constitute public performance." Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1924
(citing Columbia Pictures, 1986 WL 32729). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's award of summary judgment "on the grounds that a hotel
room was not a 'public place' and that PREII did not 'transmit or otherwise
communicate' Columbia's motion pictures" as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991). Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1924 (citing Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.24 Specifically, PREI "alleged
that Columbia[] [Pictures'] copyright action was a mere sham
that cloaked underlying acts of monopolization and conspiracy to
restrain trade.""
Responding to PREI's counterclaim, the district court awarded
summary judgment to Columbia Pictures and denied PREI's
motion for further discovery on Columbia Pictures' motivations
in filing suit against PREI. 6 The court focused particularly on
the legitimacy of Columbia Pictures' complaint, noting that "[i]t
was clear from the manner in which the case was presented that
[Columbia was] seeking and expecting a favorable judgment."2 7
In so doing, the court rejected PREI's theory that Columbia
Pictures' subjective motivations could form the basis of antitrust
liability.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's award of summary judgment."8 Judge Canby, in
announcing the court's decision, wrote:
Because the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington rule
may have a chilling effect on those who seek redress in the
courts, we have held that the exception should be applied
with caution. We see no basis for holding that a suit brought
with probable cause in fact and law may be a sham. Such a
holding would erode the first amendment right to petition
that is the basis for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine by imposing the risk of treble damages for initiating a suit based on a
well-founded, but untested, legal theory.29

24. Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1924. The operative statutory language of §§
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is set out in the text accompanying supra notes 7-8.
25. Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1924.
26. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., No.
CV 83-2594-WPG, 1990 WL 56166 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 2, 1990).
27. Id. at *1. The judge also noted that "[alithough I decided against [Columbia],
the case was far from easy to resolve, and it was evident from the opinion affirming
my order that the Court of Appeals had trouble with it as well." Id.
28. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944
F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
29. Id. at 1531 (citations omitted). Quite interestingly, Judge Canby cites California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), for the proposition that "a complaint alleging that the petitioner's competitors initiated administrative proceedings against the petitioner 'without probable cause, and regardless of
the merits,' stated an antitrust cause of action." Columbia Pictures, 944 F.2d at 1529
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The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that litigation was immune from antitrust liability unless the lawsuit is found to be
"objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits [and it is aldirectly with the business relaso] . . 'an attempt to interfere
30
tionships of a competitor.'
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas compared antitrust
liability to the tort of wrongful civil proceedings, which requires
both a lack of probable cause and malice. 3' In comparing the
two, Justice Thomas stated that "Wjust as evidence of
anticompetitive intent cannot affect the objective prong of
Noerr's sham exception, a showing of malice alone will neither
entitle the wrongful civil proceedings plaintiff to prevail nor permit the factfinder to infer the absence of probable cause."32 Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]he existence of probable cause
to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation.""
Although the Court's decision to affirm was unanimous, Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion that criticized the Court's
opinion for its "unnecessarily broad dicta."34 According to Justice Stevens, "[i]t might not be objectively reasonable to bring a
lawsuit just because some form of success on the merits-no
matter how insignificant--could be expected."35 Justice Stevens'

(emphasis added) (quoting California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512). See infra
notes 98-128 and accompanying text (arguing that California Motor Transp. does not
require that the litigation be brought without probable cause in order for the litigation to fall within the sham exception).
30. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113
S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (1993) (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
31. Id. at 1929. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing the tort
of wrongful civil proceedings).
32. Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1929-30 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 1929.
34. Id. at 1932 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined in Justice
Stevens' concurrence.
35. Id. Justice Stevens' remarks actually stop short of the full truth, as the
Court's "objectively baseless" test only requires that "an objective litigant . . . conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome." Id. at
1928 (emphasis added). As the Court notes in a footnote, although a winning lawsuit
will always be immune from antitrust liability, "when the antitrust defendant has
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concurrence suggested that the majority's bright-line rule might
not apply when the defendant filed multiple suits or engaged in
anticompetitive behavior external to the litigation.3 6
THE HARMS OF PREDATORY LITIGATION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PETITION, AND THE STATUTORY GUARANTEE OF FAIR
COMPETITION IN BUSINESS

The Harms of PredatoryLitigation
The first task in determining when litigation may be predatory is determining what types of behavior are predatory. Such a
task is not easy. The difficulty of distinguishing predatory
behavior from fair competition prompted one commentator to
paraphrase Justice Stewart's oft-quoted definition of obscenity:37 "Businessmen and judges think they know it when they
see it." 3"
Another commentator attempted to define predatory behavior
with the following language:
Predation may be defined, provisionally, as a firm's deliberate aggression against one. or more rivals through the employment of business practices that would not be considered
profit maximizing except for the expectation either that (1)
rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the predator
with a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits,
or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon combehavior the predator finds inconvenient or threatenpetitive
39
ing.
lost the underlying litigation, a court must 'resist the understandable temptation to
engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding' that an ultimately unsuccessful 'action
must have been unreasonable or without foundation. Id. at 1928 n.5 (citation omitted). Even lawsuits that are unsuccessful on the merits therefore may have immunity, regardless of the litigant's motivations for initiating them.
36. Id. at 1934-35. The facts in Columbia Pictures only presented the issue of
whether antitrust liability was appropriate when the plaintiff instituted a single lawsuit with no interest in the outcome. For a discussion of a case in which the litigant
also engaged in external anticompetitive behavior, see the discussion of United
States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 417 U.S. 901 (1974), infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text; see also infra note 145 (arguing that Columbia Pictures should not
apply when such external behavior exists).
37. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF TIE LAW OF ANTITRUST 109 (1977).
39. ROBERT H. BORK, TIE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITII ITSELF
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Litigation, and its associated costs, certainly can affect the
competitive relationship between litigants. As Joel Bennett and
Maxwell Blecher wrote:
A competitor seeking to utilize litigation as a weapon to stifle
its competition hopes to achieve any number of the following
goals:
1. Cause his competitor to incur enormous legal expenses
in defending the suit, thus diverting needed funds from marketing, sales, promotion, and research and development efforts;
2. Tie up the managerial resources of the company and
cause its executives to spend wasted time in preparing and
defending the lawsuit, as well as diverting attention from the
tasks of running the company;
3. Diverting customers away from the defendant, hopefully
to the plaintiff, who are either afraid of being sued themselves, e.g., for contributory patent infringement, or are concerned that the company being sued will not be able to fulfill
orders for products or will not survive as a viable entity long
enough to warrant exerting efforts in developing a market for
the sued company's products; and
4. Elimination of the sued entity from the marketplace
completely, thus destroying its viability as a functioning
competitor."
Courts should view litigation initiated solely to drag one's
opponents through the judicial process as predatory and subject
to the liabilities imposed by the Sherman Act. Such a view is
consistent with other areas of the law; both Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility seek to curb even the use of litigation for reasons other than the resolution of meritorious disputes. 41 No
144 (1978).
40. Bennett & Blecher, supra note 3, at 480; see Gary Myers, Litigation as a
Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 586-96 (1992) (arguing that predatory litigation

serves to eliminate competition, discipline competitors, raise rival's costs, and create
barriers to entry).
41. Rule 11 prohibits an attorney from filing pleadings, regardless of their merit,
that are presented to harass another party, cause unnecessary delay, or cause needless increase in the cost of litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
As well, attorneys have an ethical obligation to refrain from asserting or chal-
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reason exists that-when concerns about the process rather than
the outcome of that process fuel the decision to litigate-anititrust liability should not arise from that decision.
The ConstitutionalRight To Petition
The First Amendment guarantees to every individual the
right to petition the government: "Congress shall make no
law ...abridging ...the right of the people.., to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."42 The right to petition
is embedded in our nation's history and its violation was one of
the primary grievances addressed in the Declaration of Independence.43
The right to petition is an effective mechanism for bringing
the concerns and opinions of the people to the government.44
The right to petition also exposes governmental waste and misconduct.4" As well, by allowing free and unlimited petition for
redress, public sentiment may be expressed peacefully and without resort to violence.46
Although the right guarantees access to the government and
is held in great esteem by the courts,47 the right is not abso-

lenging an issue "unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1992). Under Rule 3.1, "[tlhe action is
frivolous . . . if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose
of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable . . . to make
a good faith argument on the merits." Id. at cmt. (emphasis added). Based on this
language, even if the lawyer can argue on the merits, ethical obligations apparently
preclude the lawyer from continuing the action if the client's primary purpose is to
injure the opposing party by the process of litigation.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a history of the right to petition, see Norman B.
Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . . . " An Analysis of the Neglected, But
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986).
43. Thomas Jefferson wrote:
In every stage of these oppressions, we have petitioned for redress, in
the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only
by repeated injury. A prince, whose character is thus marked by every
act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
44. Smith, supra note 42, at 1178.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1179.
47. In his concurring opinion in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), Justice
Brennan wrote of the interrelated nature of all First Amendment rights:
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lute. In McDonald v. Smith,48 the Supreme Court held that the
right to petition the government does not grant absolute immunity from liability for defamation.49 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger commented that the historical roots of the right
of petition originated prior to the Constitution and that "the
values in the right of petition [are] an important aspect of selfgovernment."" Nevertheless, the Court looked to the history of
the Framers to hold that no historical evidence existed to suggest that the Framers thought the right of petition to be an
absolute right.5
In fact, several barriers exist to limit the right to access a
court. On an elementary level, jurisdictional rules5 2 and substantive legal principles5 3 serve to limit access. Even when the
appropriate court is determined and a claimant has established
The Court previously has emphasized the essential unity of the First
Amendment's guarantees:
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom
in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the
rights of the people peacefully to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, . . . and therefore are united in
the First Article's assurances.
And although we have not previously addressed the precise issue before
us today, we have recurrently treated the right to petition similarly to,
and frequently as overlapping with, the First Amendment's other guarantees of free expression.
Id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)). At least one commentator has suggested that right-to-petition analysis
should mirror free speech analysis. See Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right To Petition Cases, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1243 (1984).
48. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
49. Id. at 485. The Court wrote that the right to petition only created a qualified
privilege, and because North Carolina's definition of defamation was consistent with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Petition Clause did not
require anything more than that the plaintiff show that the defendant's statements
were made with actual malice as that term was defined in Sullivan. McDonald, 472
U.S. at 485.
50. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483.
51. Id.
52. For example, both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction limit
the ability of a party to access a court.
53. All legal actions must be based on a cognizable, substantive legal claim or else
suffer dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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a sufficient legal claim, the parties' right to a hearing remains
restricted. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is one
example of such a restriction. Rule 11 prohibits an attorney from
submitting documents to the court that are presented for "any
improper purpose" 4 or that are not "warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.""
The United States Code also limits the right to petition the
court, providing that
[any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who

so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 6
Federal courts also have the inherent power to sanction both
attorneys and parties," provided that the attorney or party has
acted in bad faith."
The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process also
limit a party's ability to prosecute a lawsuit. 9 In order to be
successful in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff
must show favorable termination of a former proceeding initiated by the defendant against the plaintiff.6 " The plaintiff must
also show that the defendant initiated the former proceeding

54. Id. rule 11(b)(1). Under Rule 11, examples of "improper purpose" include harassing another party, causing unnecessary delay, or causing needless increase in the
cost of litigation. Id.
55. Id. rule 11(b)(2).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
57. JEROLD S. SOL'OVY ET AL., SANCTIONS IN FEDERAL LITIGATION § 4.02 (1991).
58. Id. § 4.03. Under the court's inherent power, "Itlhe bad-faith exception for the
award of attorney's fees is not restricted to cases where the action is filed in bad
faith. "'Bad faith" may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but
also in the conduct of the litigation."' Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,
766 (1980) (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)).
59. In the context of civil proceedings, the tort of malicious prosecution is sometimes referred to as the tort of wrongful civil proceedings. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 889 (5th ed. 1984). For
the purposes of this Note, the term "malicious prosecution" will refer to all torts applicable to actions arising from wrongful civil proceedings.
60. Id. at 892.
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with malice61 and without probable cause.6 2 The plaintiff also
must show damages; "[c]ounsel fees incurred in defending
against the wrongful civil suit are prominent among items of
recovery."' Finally, a significant minority of jurisdictions require the plaintiff to show a "special grievance,' such as interference with his person or property by reason of the litigation."'
The tort of abuse of process is similar to the tort of malicious
prosecution, except that abuse of process does not require the
plaintiff to prove that the former proceeding ended in her favor
or that it was brought without probable cause.' "Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that the gist of the
tort is not commencing an action or causing process to issue
without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to
accomplish."66 Accordingly, abuse of process seems most analogous to the concept of limitations on the right to bring an otherwise proper action for an improper purpose.6
This discussion of the constitutional right to petition leads to

61. Id. at 894-95. "Malice" is a term of art and may be found where the primary
motive of the defendant was "ill will[l or a lack of belief in any possible success of
the action." I& at 895. Malice may also be found "where the proceeding was begun
primarily for a purpose other than the adjudication of the claim in suit." Id. This
understanding of malice seems to incorporate the notion of "improper purpose."
62. Id. at 893. In the context of a civil action, probable cause most likely means
that the initiating party "reasonably believes that he has a good chance of establishing [the claim] to the satisfaction of the court or the jury." Id Where a party is
uncertain as to the view a court will adopt, a party does not act without probable
cause in submitting "a doubtful issue of law." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 889. Four reasons are advanced for this requirement. First is the fact
that because the plaintiff was successful in the former proceeding, he should be seen
to have been made whole in his victory. Id. This reason, however, ignores the potential expense the plaintiff incurred in defending against the former action. Second,
the requirement does prevent a chilling effect against honest litigants who should
not fear subsequent actions arising out of their legitimate litigation activities. Id.
Third, the requirement places a definite end to the course of litigation. Id. Finally,
some courts have expressed a belief that "not all ills can be relieved by more litigation." Id. at 890; see Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1981); see also infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text (discussing some of these problems in the
context of antitrust liability).
65. KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, § 121, at 897.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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two conclusions. First, courts hold the right to petition in great
esteem and often will grant it significant weight when balanced
against other rights. Second, in spite of its standing as a fundamental right, the right to petition is not absolute and, in the
context of courts, is limited by many rules that control the behavior of litigants.
The Statutory Guaranteeof Fair Competition
Historically, both common law and statutory law have protected the guarantee of fair competition in business." American
law promptly adopted the English common law rule against
unreasonable restraints, viewing the rule as "an expression of
individual liberty and free enterprise, the very epitome of the
American ethic."6 9 However, the common law soon became inadequate to handle an industrializing, expanding country. 0
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act "in response to
strong public fear of and hostility against monopolistic combinations and their anticompetitive business practices."7 The Act's
sponsor referred to the Act in congressional debate as a "bill of
rights" and a "charter of liberty."7 Wrote Chief Justice Hughes:
"As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions."'
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were expressed in very
broad language,7 4 and part of Congress' intent in passing the

68. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 6, § 1.01[11.
69. Id. § 1.0213].
70. Id. § 1.0214. Two reasons are suggested for this inadequacy. First, there was
no uniformity in the country's antitrust laws as each state developed its own law.
Id. Second, the majority of these laws were "defensive" in nature, voiding the restraining contract instead of punishing the guilty parties. Id.
71. Id. § 2.01. The Sherman Act prohibits "jelvery contract, combination in the
form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Act also prohibits all "attempt[s] to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations." Id. § 2.
72. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 6, § 2.01, at 2-3 n.8.
73. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933), overruled in
part by, Copperwald Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 469 U.S. 927 (1984).
74. See supra note 71 (quoting statutory language of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
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Act was to grant the federal courts a new jurisdiction to create a
federal common law of antitrust.7 5 However, the values that
courts have read into the Act have been the subject of much debate.7" The debate has focused on whether the Act is centered
on the value of consumer welfare 7 -- protecting individuals from
massive capital aggregation 7 8 -or the value of promoting an
economy of small, competitive units.7 Depending on which value the interpreting court chooses, the balance between the constitutional right to petition and the statutory guarantee of fair
competition may be affected.8"

75. See 21 CONG. REc. 3,152 (1890). As mentioned previously, "Congress' overriding objective was to attempt to restore, as far as possible, a free and open competitive environment absent anticompetitive business restraints . . . ." 1 KINTNER, supra
note 9, § 4.1, at 126. Summarizing the Act's legislative history, Kintner concluded
that Congress was "generally comfortable with the common law principles regarding
restraints of trade and monopolies" and was concerned mostly with developing a national law of antitrust capable of regulating businesses free to avoid state law by
setting up in a different state. See id. at 128.
76. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Shefman Act, J.L.
& ECON., Oct. 1966, at 7.
77. Id. If a court interprets the Act to maximize consumer welfare, then the court
must "distinguish between agreements or activities that increase wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction of output." Id. In such a value
system, the Act's substantive result is a maximization of production, rather than any
restructuring of the economy that Congress would have deemed worthy regardless of
the effect on output. Id.
78. Id. at 8. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), Judge Learned Hand wrote:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but . . . there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself. . . showed
that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end
to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them.
Id. at 428. Such an approach is fundamentally different from an approach maximizing consumer welfare, see supra note 77, as Judge Hand's values place a desired
economic organization above a maximization of consumer welfare.
79. Judge Hand reiterated his commitment to the values of economic organization
stating that "ft]hroughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake
and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can
effectively compete with each other." Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
80. See infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
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Needless to say, the broad language of the Sherman Act did
not provide much guidance in balancing the competing interests
of the First Amendment's right to petition and the Act's guarantee of fair competition. Thus, the courts were left to develop the
appropriate balance between these two important interests.
THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE AND THE LITIGANT'S
REASONS FOR PETITIONING THE COURTS

This Note argues that, in determining whether litigation is
subject to antitrust immunity, courts should look to the litigant's
motivation in initiating the litigation. In addition, courts should
establish whether the anticompetitive harm is an incidental
effect of a judgment or whether that harm is directly caused by
the litigation process. For the purpose of this Note, this analysis
is labeled the direct purpose/incidental effect analysis.
The Beginning of Immunity for Petitioning: The Development of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act
did not prohibit a group of businesses from petitioning the government using deceptive tactics, even though the petitioners'
sole motivation was to harm and destroy their competitors."

81. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
82. Id. at 138-41. Noerr Motor Freight, along with 41 Pennsylvania truck operators and the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association, filed suit against the Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference and several individual defendants after the defendants successfully petitioned the governor of Pennsylvania to veto the "Fair Motor
Bill." Id. at 129-30. The Fair Motor Bill, which would have increased the maximum
weight of a trucker's load on Pennsylvania roads, was directly against the interests
of the railroads, who were in an economic struggle with the truckers for the long
hauling oE heavy freight. See id. at 128-30.
At trial, the trial judge found that "the defendants combined . . . with the intent and object of substantially lessening competition in the long-haul carriage of
freight in unreasonable restraint of trade," Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1957), affd, 273 F.2d 218
(3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and that the defendants' campaign revolved around a technique whose 'sole means and ... effectiveness is to take a
dramatic fragment of truth and by emphasis and repetition distort it into falsehood."
Id. at 814.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Black began from the premise
that "no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws."83 The
Court also recognized that the restraint at bar bore little similarity to traditional restraints of trade, noting that this dissimilarity "constitute[d] a warning against treating the defendants'
conduct as though it amounted to a common-law trade restraint."'
Two factors punctuated the Court's holding that the Sherman
Act did not prohibit mere petitioning of government. First, the
Court stated that liability "would substantially impair the power
of government to take actions through its legislature and executive that operate to restrain trade."' By creating such liability,
individuals and associations would be chilled in their attempts
"to make their wishes known to their representatives."8 6 This
interaction, the Court believed, was the cornerstone of representative democracy. 7 Second, the Court refused to construe the
Sherman Act to create liability that arguably contradicted the
constitutional protection of petitioning.8
Thus, the Court was left to determine whether the defendants'
anticompetitive purpose and use of deceptive publicity tactics
created antitrust liability where no liability would exist for the
mere act of petitioning the government. The Court easily disposed of the deceptive practices argument, noting that the lower
courts had dismissed a similar counterclaim against the plaintiffs for using nearly identical tactics against the railroads. 9
The Court also stated that, although the tactics may "fall[] far
short of the ethical standards generally approved of in this country... [i]nsofar as [the] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a

83. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 137.
85. Id. The Court had already held that the Sherman Act did not prohibit a state
regulatory program that restrained trade. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52
(1943).
86. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 137-38. Although the Court's constitutional discussion in Noerr was dicta, the constitutional underpinnings of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine grew stronger
with time. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
89. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141.
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code that condemns trade restraints, not political activity.""
The Court also was not troubled with its decision regarding
anticompetitive purpose. Wrote Justice Black:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in
government of their desires with respect to the passage or
enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon
their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for
people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring
about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to
their competitors .... [A]t least insofar as the railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its
legality was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had.9'
The Court went further, noting that, although the trial court
found that the defendants' purpose "was to destroy the goodwill
of the truckers among the public generally and among the
truckers' customers particularly" and weaken the truckers' competitive position, no specific findings were made that the defendants directly attempted to persuade anyone to cease dealing
with the truckers.9 2
The focus of the Court's analysis was the direct purpose or
intent of the defendants' petitioning activities.93 However, the
direct purpose should be distinguished from the indirect effect of
the defendants' activities. The Court noted that "[i]t is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by a
campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some ditect injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed."9 4
The Court also noted that the defendants' awareness of this

90. Id. at 140.
91. Id. at 139-40. Five years later the Court reaffirmed its decision in Noerr, stating that "[niothing could be clearer from the Court's opinion [in Noerr] than that
anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize" political activity. United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). As in Noerr, the defendants in Pennington
were legitimately attempting to influence the government. See id. at 660-61.
92. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142. The Court noted that the record showed only attempts
to influence the passage and enforcement of laws. Id.
93. In Noerr, the record showed that the defendants were legitimately attempting
to influence the passage of the Fair Motor Bill. Id. at 142-43.
94. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
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effect was irrelevant. 95
Although the facts before the Court were insufficient to create
antitrust liability, the Court stated in dicta that there may be
situations where petitioning, "ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor."9 In such a case
"the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."9 7 Such
an analysis would require a court to look at the factors that
motivate an individual or group to petition the government.
Extending the Immunity to Adjudicatory Tribunals: California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,"
the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to protect
petitioning in adjudicatory tribunals from antitrust liability.99
Besides extending the doctrine to adjudicatory tribunals, 1'0
California Motor Transport also provided the doctrine with a
stronger constitutional basis and expanded the meaning of
Noerr's sham exception. 0 1 This Note argues that California

95. Id. at 143-44.
96. Id. at 144.
97. Id. Noerr's sham exception furthers the direct purpose analysis. Although
Noerr clearly held liability was not warranted where the anticompetitive effect was
incidental to legitimate petitioning activity, the sham exception cautions courts to determine whether the activity is legitimately aimed at petitioning or interfering with
a competitor's business relationships.
98. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
99. Trucking Unlimited's complaint alleged that California Motor Transport and
other defendants engaged in a conspiracy to institute adjudicatory proceedings to defeat applications made by Trucking Unlimited 'to acquire operating rights or to
transfer or register those rights." Id. at 509. Trucking Unlimited alleged that the
conspiracy extended "to rehearings and to reviews or appeals from agency or court
decisions on these matters." Id.
100, After Noerr and Pennington, some lower courts held that the doctrine did not
protect petitioning in adjudicatory tribunals. See, e.g., United States v. Otter Tail
Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 62, amended, No. 6-69-CIV-139, 1971 WL 574 (D. Minn.
Sept. 9, 1971), affd in part and vacated in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
101. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510. Strengthening the constitutional
basis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Court stated that "[tihe right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." Id. The Court's decision
in Noerr was based on the Court's statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act. See
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Motor Transport continues the Noerr analysis of direct purpose
and incidental effect."0 2 Although the Court held that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine extended to adjudicatory tribunals," 3 the Court relied on Noerr's sham exception to hold that
the lower court erred in dismissing Trucking Unlimited's complaint for failing to state a claim." 4
Again, the Court's decision focused on improper purpose and
unethical conduct."°5 The improper purpose in California Motor
Transport, however, was not the anticompetitive purpose that
motivated legitimate petitioning activity protected in Noerr; °6
instead, the Court found that Trucking Unlimited's allegations
were "not that the conspirators sought 'to influence public officials,' but that they sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that
decisionmaking process. ")107

supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text. Wrote Justice Douglas for the Court:
[Ilt would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies
and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.
California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11. By expressly basing the NoerrPennington doctrine on the constitutional protection of association and, more importantly, petition, the Court insulated the doctrine from congressional correction. See
U.S. CONST. Art. VI cl. 2. As well, the constitutional basis allowed future courts to
expand the Noerr-Pennington doctrine beyond the substantive area of antitrust law.
See In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 845 F. Supp.
1377, 1384 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993), requires the probable cause
element in a malicious prosecution action to be defined objectively); Hirschfeld v.
Spanakos, No. Civ. 1588 (LAK), 1994 WL 709595, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1994)
("The Court believes that the sham exception to the Noerr rule of antitrust immunity is applicable here by analogy, as the same First Amendment interests animate
the treatment both of the actions of the Board of Elections in invoking the appellate
process and of businesses accused of abusing governmental process for
anticompetitive reasons."). For scholarly commentary suggesting that courts should be
reluctant to continue such expansion, see Zauzmer, supra note 47.
102. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
103. CaliforniaMotor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11.
104. Id. at 511.
105. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 82.
107. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512. Trucking Unlimited alleged that
"the power, strategy, and resources of the petitioners were used to harass and deter
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Addressing the issue of unethical conduct, the Court distinguished unethical conduct in an adjudicatory tribunal from unethical conduct in other branches of government: "There are
many... forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may
corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may
result in antitrust violations. Misrepresentations, condoned in
the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudi1
catory process.""
By distinguishing between the political and
judicial arenas, the Court seemingly suggested that a separate
sham exception applied when predatory litigation was at is10 9
sue.
The Court, however, did not expressly address the issue of
whether meritorious litigation could ever fall within the sham
exception. In fact, the Court noted that "a pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims" may result in antitrust liability," which
might suggest that only frivolous litigation would be subject to
antitrust liability. However, Trucking Unlimited's pleadings
clearly alleged that California Motor Transport "instituted the
proceedings and actions ... with or without probable cause, and
regardless of the merits of the cases,""' thereby suggesting
that the merits of the litigation were not an issue in the Court's
decision.1

respondents in their use of administrative and judicial proceedings." Id. at 511.
Respondents also characterized "the aim and purpose of the conspiracy as 'putting
their competitors, including plaintiff, out of business, of weakening such competitors,
of destroying, eliminating and weakening existing and potential competition, and of
monopolizing the highway common carriage business in California and elsewhere.Id. Finally, Trucking Unlimited alleged that California Motor Transport "instituted
the proceedings . . . with or without probable cause and regardless of the merits."
Id. at 512.
Because the immediate issue before the Court was whether the district court
properly dismissed the complaint for failing to state a cause of action, the Court was
required to accept as true all the allegations in Trucking Unlimited's favor. Id. at
515-16.
108. Id. at 513.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 512.
112. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart drew prominent attention to this allegation, noting that "[u]nder these allegations, liberally construed, the respondents are
entitled to prove that the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke the processes of the administrative agencies and courts, but to discourage and ultimately
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Such a result at least comports with the Court's language in
Noerr."3 Arguably, Noerr's sham exception focused solely on
whether one intended to interfere directly with a competitor,
having no legitimate interest in influencing governmental action.'14 Although the Court recognized California Motor
Transport's protected right to petition the courts, it noted that
the right to petition did not absolutely immunize litigation from
antitrust liability." 5 The Court repeated that "[i]t is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from reguas an integral part of conduct which
lation when they are used
' 6
violates a valid statute."
Developing the Meaning of California Motor Transport: United
States v. Otter Tail Power Company
One of the first opportunities for the lower courts to interpret
the Court's decision in CaliforniaMotor Transport was presented in United States v. Otter Tail Power Co." ' Prior to the
Court's decision in California Motor Transport, a district court

prevent the respondents from invoking those processes." Id. at 518 (Stewart, J. concurring).
113. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
114. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961). Justice Stewart's concurrence in California Motor Transport addresses
the sham exception as a question of intent. See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S.
at 518 (Stewart, J. concurring) (arguing that use of process motivated by an intent
to deny another party from using process would fall under Noerr's sham exception).
115. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
116. Id. at 514. The Court's language is especially interesting when viewed in light
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One of the certifications made by
a lawyer signing a pleading under Rule 11 is that the suit "is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
117. 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973), affd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974). Otter Tail was
charged with violating § 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting to prevent municipalities from building municipal power systems instead of contracting with Otter Tail to
carry electric power. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369
(1973). Specifically, the district court found that Otter Tail had attempted to monopolize the retail distribution of electric power by refusing to sell power at wholesale
to proposed municipal distribution competitors, by refusing to "wheel" power to these
competitors, by instituting and supporting litigation "designed to prevent or delay
[the] establishment of those systems," and by invoking provisions in its transmission
contracts with other suppliers so as to deny access to the municipal systems. Id. at
368.
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in Minnesota enjoined Otter Tail from "instituting, supporting,
or engaging in litigation, directly or indirectly, against municipalities and their officials who have voted to establish municipal
electric power systems for the purpose of delaying, preventing,
or interfering with the establishment of a municipal electric
power system,"11 reasoning that "Noerr does not free from antitrust sanctions the institution of court litigation."'' 9
The Supreme Court vacated this portion of the lower court's
order and remanded the case to be decided in light of California
Motor Transport.2 ' Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
stated that the "use of ...judicial processes where the purpose
to suppress competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims.., is within the
'mere sham' exception announced in Noerr."''
On remand, the district court denied Otter Tail's motion to
amend the findings to reflect that its litigation activities were
immune from antitrust liability, noting that "the repetitive use
of litigation by Otter Tail was timed and designed to prevent the
establishment of municipal electric systems and thereby to preserve defendant's monopoly."'2 2 As such, the court affirmed its
that the litigation came within Noerr's sham excepholding
23
tion. 1
Like the Court's decision in California Motor Transport, the
Otter Tail decisions do not clearly address the issue of whether
meritorious litigation is per se immune from antitrust liability.
In its first decision, before the Supreme Court decided California
Motor Transport, the district court found that Otter Tail initiated court litigation against municipalities "which had the effect of
frustrating the sale of revenue bonds to finance the municipal

118. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369.
119. Otter Tail, 331 F. Supp. at 62.
120. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 380. More than just predatory litigation was involved
in Otter Tail. See supra note 117. The scope of this Note is limited to whether litigation, by itself, may warrant antitrust liability. This discussion should in no way
suggest that acts independent of litigation are immune from antitrust liability in the
same manner as is litigation.
121. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 380.
122. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973),
affd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
123. Id. at 452.
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systems."'2 4 Although the court found that all of Otter Tail's
litigation was unsuccessful on the merits, no specific finding was
made by the district court that any of the litigation was
meritless.,20
On the other hand, Justice Douglas' opinion in Otter Tail
stressed the lack of merit of the litigation, referring to "repetitive
lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims."'26 The
district court's opinion on remand made no further mention of
the merits of Otter Tail's litigation, stating only that "the repetitive use of litigation by Otter Tail was timed and designed principally to prevent the establishment of municipal electric systems and thereby to preserve defendant's monopoly."'27 The
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's decision,
at least tacitly approving the district court's analysis. 2 '
The Direct Purpose/Incidental Effect Analysis and Vendo
Company v. Lektro-Vend Corporation
In Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Vendo Company
v. Lektro-Vend Corporation,2 ' the direct purpose/incidental ef-

124. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Minn. 1971).
The court noted that in order for the municipalities to successfully raise revenue,
"a] 'no litigation certificate,' reflecting the absence of litigation which might impair
the salability of revenue bonds, [wasl essential." Id. The causal relationship between
Otter Tail Power Company's initiation of litigation and the harm to the municipalities was that the "pendency of litigation hald] the effect of preventing the marketing
of the necessary bonds thus preventing the establishment of a municipal system." Id.
125. Id. This Note defines "meritorious litigation" as litigation that is not objectively baseless as defined in Columbia Pictures. See supra note 20. Even though Otter Tail Power Company's litigation was unsuccessful on the merits, such a finding
does not necessarily mean that the litigation was objectively baseless. The notion of
objectively baseless litigation is discussed extensively at supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
126. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
127. Otter Tail, 360 F. Supp. at 451. By stressing the purpose of the litigation, the
district court apparently employed the direct purpose/incidental effect analysis. Arguably, the court was stating that Otter Tail was not interested in the outcome of the
litigation but, instead, was only interested in the dilatory effects that such litigation
would cause.
128. Otter Tail, 417 U.S. 901.
129. 433 U.S. 623, 643 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court in Vendo confronted the issue of when a federal court can enjoin an already-commenced state
court proceeding that violates federal law. Id. at 623.
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fect analysis easily could have decided the issue that Justice
Blackmun found to control the outcome of the case. 3 ' Justice
Blackmun expressed the opinion that an anti-competition agreement and the initiation of litigation to enforce that agreement
did not violate the Sherman Act. 3' Specifically, Justice
Blackmun wrote that "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims or
some equivalent showing of grave abuse of the state courts must
exist before an injunction would be proper.""3 2
Justice Blackmun briefly discussed in dicta the role of the
litigant's purpose in determining whether litigation creates antitrust liability. "In my view," wrote Justice Blackmun,
the District Court failed properly to apply the CaliforniaMotor Transport rule. The court believed that it was enough
that Vendo's activities in the single state-court proceeding
involved in this case were not genuine attempts to use the
state adjudicative process legitimately. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to Vendo's purpose in conducting the

Two lawsuits were at the center of the dispute in Vendo. The first suit, filed in
state court by Lektro-Vend Corporation, sought damages for the violation of a noncompetition agreement in an employment contract between Harry Stoner, who manufactured vending machines for Vendo, and Lektro-Vend. Id. at 627. Vendo subsequently filed an action in federal district court alleging that Lektro-Vend had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, specifically alleging that the non-competition
agreements were unreasonable restraints of trade and that Lektro-Vend's state claim
was brought to "unlawfully harass" Vendo and to eliminate them as competitors. Id.
After a $7 million judgment against Stoner was affirmed on appeal in state
court, the federal district court preliminarily enjoined the state court from enforcing
the judgement, holding that there was persuasive evidence that the agreement was
overly broad and that the litigation activity was not a "genuine attempt to use the
adjudicative process legitimately." Id. at 629. As well, the district court found that
collection efforts could possibly eliminate federal jurisdiction in this case. Id. The
district court's order was affirmed by the court of appeals. Id.
130. Two issues were before the Court on appeal. The first issue was whether the
district court's order was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1988). Three Justices, led by then Justice Rehnquist, reversed the court of appeals,
holding that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the district court's order. See Vendo,
433 U.S. at 626-43.
The second issue, which Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger discussed,
was whether the anti-competition agreement and the initiation of litigation to enforce that agreement violated the Sherman Act. See id. at 643-45 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
131. Id. at 645 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 644 n.1.
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state litigation and to several negative consequences that the
litigation had for respondents. The court, however, did ifot
find a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims," nor could it
have done so under the circumstances.' 33

California Motor Transport never stated, however, that a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims was a necessary finding before
antitrust liability would result from the decision to litigate.'3 4
Four justices dissented from the Court's ruling, claiming in part
that a state court's finding that litigation was meritorious "does
not disprove the existence of a serious federal antitrust
violation."' 35
Although Justice Blackmun's concurrence was based on his
belief that a single lawsuit was not enough to create antitrust
liability,'3 6 he noted that the state court proceeding resulted in
a judgment of over seven million dollars.'37 Under the direct
purpose/incidental effect analysis, the fact that a litigant obtained a seven million dollar judgment would be strong, if not
incontrovertible, evidence that the litigant sought to use, rather
than abuse, process. 3 '

133. Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
134. See California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 509, 511-16
(1972); see also supra notes 98-116 and accompanying text.
135. Vendo, 433 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent's position must be
read for what it is, however. The issue before the Court was only whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate. As such, the Court's opinions on the merits are
somewhat speculative.
136. Id. at 643-45 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Myers, supra note 40, at 61924 (arguing that a single sham lawsuit should not be found per se incapable of
creating antitrust liability); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240, 1254-57 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that, although multiple actions
will make proving sham easier, a single lawsuit is sufficient to show lack of genuine
petitioning activity), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v.
Massachusetts Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-10868-PBS, 1994 WL
683155 (D. Mass., Nov. 8, 1994) (relying on Columbia Pictures to hold that a single
lawsuit can give rise to liability under the sham exception).
137. Vendo, 433 U.S. at 645 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also
noted that the judgment had been affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id.
138. For a more detailed discussion of a favorable verdict's effect on this analysis,
see supra note 35.
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PROPOSING A FAIRER TEST To DETERMINE WHEN THE DECISION
To LITIGATE SHOULD CREATE ANTITRUST LIABILITY

The Supreme Court's holding in Columbia Pictures completely
immunizes meritorious litigation from antitrust liability, regardless of the plaintiffs purpose in initiating the litigation.'39 In
practice, Columbia Pictures has limited courts' inquiries as to
whether litigation was "objectively baseless." 4 '
However, at least one court refused to extend the Court's test
further than the facts specific to Columbia Pictures. In USSPOSCO Industries v. Contra Costa County Building and Con-

struction Trades Council,' the Ninth Circuit held that Columbia Pictures"provides a strict two-step analysis to assess whether a single action constitutes sham petitioning."'4 2 When the
complaint alleges a series of lawsuits, however, the court held
that "[tihe inquiry in such cases is prospective: Were the legal
filings made, not out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but as part of a pattern or practice of successive filings
Alundertaken essentially for purposes of harassment?"'
though there is no reason to predicate the direct purpose/incidental effect test on the number of filings made,' the

139. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 158 (9th
Cir. 1993) ("While not ultimately successful or of overwhelming strength, the suit
was not so objectively baseless that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits."), cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3863 (June 1, 1994); Harris Custom
Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer, 834 F. Supp. 256, 261-62 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("An action
that is well enough grounded, factually and legally, to survive a motion for summary
judgment is sufficiently meritorious to lead a reasonable litigant to conclude that
they had some chance of success on the merits.").
141. 31 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 810-11 (emphasis added). The court noted that '[tihis inquiry is essentially retrospective: If the suit turns out to have objective merit, the plaintiff can't
proceed to inquire into subjective purposes." Id. at 811.
143. Id. Even though the court phrased the issue in terms of intentions or purposes, the court's analysis of the issue still focused on the merits of the actions, as the
court held that the plaintiff could not show that the filings were undertaken to harass when over half of them were successful. Id.
144. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240,
1254-57 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that, although multiple actions will make proving
sham easier, a single lawsuit is sufficient to show lack of genuine petitioning activity), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
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court's holding does recognize the central focus placed on a
litigant's subjective intent.4 '
At least two concerns punctuate the Court's decision in Columbia Pictures. First, a subjective test that looks only to the
litigant's subjective motivations in bringing the litigation may
punish unjustly litigants who legitimately bring suits seeking a
favorable outcome and may chill potential litigants from asserting untested legal claims.'46 Second, "[a] subjective test also
could cause a tremendous increase in time and judicial resources
spent to punish the rare litigant who lacks any concern for the
judicial outcome of a meritorious lawsuit."'4 7
Such a subjective test was proposed by the Fifth Circuit in In
re Burlington Northern, Inc.,' where the court held that "success on the merits does not necessarily preclude an antitrust
plaintiff from proving that the defendant's earlier litigation
activities were sham."' The successful litigation at issue in
Burlington Northern involved a water contract between the
plaintiffs and the United States Department of the Interior, the
water being needed for the operation of a pipeline.'5 ° The defendants successfully invalidated that contract. 151
The scope of Burlington Northern, however, is limited. In say-

145. By returning to a litigant's intentions, the court provides ammunition for the
argument that, in any case where the issue goes beyond a single lawsuit with no
evidence of external anticompetitive behavior, Columbia Pictures should not apply. If
this argument is correct, the Columbia Pictures analysis would be inappropriate in a
case such as United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Instead,
under the facts in Otter Tail, see supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text, a
plaintiff should be able to show to the court that the defendant was not interested
in the merits of the initial litigation.
146. See Matthew E. Johnson, Comment, Meritorious Litigation as a Section 2 Violation-In Re Burlington Northern, Inc. Broadens Noerr-Pennington's Sham Exception, 74 IOWA L. REV. 271, 281 (1988).
147. Id.
148. 822 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988). After Columbia Pictures, Burlington Northern is no longer good law insofar as it holds that subjective intent alone may create antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.
149. Id. at 528. In Burlington Northern, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
railroads conspired to prevent the construction of a coal slurry pipeline. Id. at 520.
The railroads, according to the plaintiff, opposed the pipeline because they expected
to lose business hauling coal slurry once the pipeline was built. Id. at 521.
150. Id.
151. Id.

1995]

PREVENTING PREDATORY LITIGATION

1163

ing that success on the merits does not create an absolute bar on
antitrust liability, the court only was allowing the plaintiff to
engage in discovery to determine the defendants' intentions for
initiating the litigation.152 No finding was made that the specific facts of the case would warrant antitrust liability.
Under the direct purpose/incidental effect test, courts should
look to determine whether the litigant sought to harm his competitor through the outcome of the litigation or through the process of the litigation.153 Therefore, if the anticompetitive harm
in Burlington Northern was created not by the process of litigation but by the litigation's outcome, Noerr immunity would exist
regardless of the litigant's anticompetitive intent.' On the
other hand, if the litigant had no intention to influence the passage or enforcement of laws, then Noerr immunity should not attach.'55 In order to so determine, courts, as an initial matter,
should look to the litigation under question to see if its outcome
possibly could alter the competitive relationship.
At least one commentator has voiced concern over the
Burlington Northern test, arguing that factfinders would have a
difficult time determining when litigants were motivated by "the
necessary degree of subjective intent."55 However, if the jury's
first determination is whether the outcome was capable of harming competition, then subjective intent would be relevant only in
the few cases where the litigation could have no effect on the
competitive relationship.'57
Accordingly, rather than focusing on whether litigation was

152. Id. at 533-34.
153. Immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine exists only when the litigant is
actually attempting to influence the passage or enforcement of laws. See supra notes
96-97 and accompanying text.
154. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
140 (1960).
155. Id.
156. Johnson, supra note 146, at 282.
157. This determination would replace the Court's "objectively baseless" determination in Columbia Pictures. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993). Rather than presuming that all colorable litigation was brought to achieve the outcome, looking to whether the outcome
could affect the competitive relationship would presume that litigation where the
outcome would have affected the competitive relationship was brought to achieve
that result.
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"objectively baseless," 5 ' courts should focus on whether the
litigation's outcome could affect the competitive relationship
between the litigants. If the outcome could affect the competitive
relationship, then a litigant's anticompetitive intent would be
irrelevant because anticompetitive intent does not create antitrust liability when a litigant is legitimately seeking to influence
the government." 9 Only if the outcome would not affect the
competitive relationship 6 ' should courts look to determine
whether the litigation "conceals 'an attempt to interfere
directly
6'
competitor."";
a
of
relationships
with the business
This test closely mirrors the Seventh Circuit's test in GripPak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. 62 In Grip-Pak, Judge
Posner, writing for the court, stated that
we are not prepared to rule that the difficulty of distinguishing lawful from unlawful purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute that such litigation can never be considered an actionable restraint of trade, provided it has some,
though perhaps only threadbare, basis in law. Many claims
not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their own
sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning,
would be too low to repay the investment in litigation."
As an example of an unlawful purpose, Judge Posner provided
the following:

158. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
159. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140.
160. By looking to the outcome of litigation, courts would include not only objectively baseless suits but also trivial, although colorable, suits that create economic
harm.
161. Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144). Under
this analysis, even trivial lawsuits incapable of harming the competitive relationship
through their outcome would be immune from antitrust liability unless the antitrust
plaintiff could show that the litigant sought to use the judicial process, rather than
the outcome, as an anticompetitive weapon.
162. 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). Grip-Pak was
attempting to produce plastic holders for beverage six-packs, a market in which Illinois Tool Works captured 90% of the market. Id. at 468. After a state court judge
found that Illinois Tool Works' litigation was not brought maliciously, the district
court dismissed Grip-Pak's antitrust complaint. Id. at 468-69.
163. Id. at 472.
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Suppose a monopolist brought a tort action against its single,
tiny competitor; the action had a colorable basis in law;[" ]
but in fact the monopolist would never have brought the
suit-its chances of winning, or the damages it could hope to
get if it did win, were too small compared to what it would
have to spend on the litigation-except that it wanted to use
pretrial discovery to discover its competitor's trade secrets; or
hoped that the competitor would be required to make public
disclosure of its potential liability in the suit and that this
disclosure would increase the interest rate that the competitor had to pay for bank financing; or just wanted to impose
heavy legal costs on the competitor in the hope of deterring
entry by other firms."
In all these examples, "the plaintiff wants to hurt a competitor
not by getting a judgment against him, which would be a proper
objective, but just by the maintenance of the suit, regardless of
its outcome."16 6
As well, the direct purpose/incidental effect test addresses the
concerns of the Sixth Circuit in Westmac, Inc. v. Smith."7 Because a plaintiff with a meritorious claim generally will bring
that claim seeking success on the merits, the court held that a
lawsuit raising "a legal issue of genuine substance" raises a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was interested in the
outcome. 6 ' By placing the burden on the defendant to show
otherwise, the court adequately addressed First Amendment
concerns.' 69 Similarly, by focusing the analysis first on whether
successful adjudication on the merits can injure the competitor,
the direct purpose/incidental effect analysis also protects First
Amendment interests.
By focusing on whether the outcome of the litigation is capa-

164. Under the test set out in Columbia Pictures, the antitrust defendant would be
entitled to summary judgment because the litigation would be objectively reasonable.
See Columbia Pictures, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
165. Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 472.
166. Id.
167. 797 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035 (1987). In Westmac,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant used litigation to oppose plaintiffs efforts to
obtain bond financing to build grain elevators. Id. at 314-15.
168. Id. at 318.
169. Id.
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ble of affecting the competitive relationship, courts will not
waste judicial resources, as such a determination is equally
amenable to summary judgment proceedings as is the "objectively baseless" prong of the current test.17 Furthermore, such a
test infrequently will chill potential litigants for two reasons.
First, antitrust liability exists only where the litigation is between business competitors.17 1 By requiring this relationship,
litigants are put on notice to be alert for the special concerns
voiced in the Sherman Act. Second, even when litigation is not
immunized under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the antitrust
plaintiff
still must prove a substantive violation of the Sherman
172
Act.
CONCLUSION

The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine has long balanced the constitutional right to petition with the substantive protection of the
Sherman Act. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, legitimate
petitioning efforts, whereby the petitioner genuinely seeks to
influence the passage or enforcement of laws, are absolutely immune from antitrust liability.
In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures,73
the Supreme Court presumed that litigation that is objectively
reasonable-that is, where an objective litigant concludes that
"the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome '' 4-is a legitimate petitioning effort as a matter of law.
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing for summary judgment).
171. See 2 KINTNER, supra note 9, § 10.2, at 62.
172. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113
S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (1993); id. at 1936 (Stevens, J., concurring). In order to win treble
damages under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
"had market power in the relevant market and that it acquired or maintained that
power through improper means." Johnson, supra note 146, at 275 (citing United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). As well, the, plaintiff must
show that the litigation caused an antitrust injury. See Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir. 1991),
affd, 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993) (holding that "the costs of defending .'. . suit would
constitute antitrust injury"). A detailed discussion of the substantive elements of
antitrust law is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more in-depth discussion of
these elements, see 2 KINTNER, supra note 9, §§ 9-10.
173. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
174. Id. at 1928.
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Such an approach provides too little deference to the differences
between the lawful and unlawful purposes set out in the NoerrPennington doctrine.
A more balanced test would require courts to look first to the
'desired outcome of the litigation. If that outcome could affect the
competitive relationship between the litigants, then Noerr immunity should attach. However, if the outcome of the litigation
would have only minimal affect on the competitive relationship,
courts should determine whether the litigant is using the process of litigation to inflict antitrust injury.
Such a test reflects a compromise between the strong interests
in both the right to petition and the substantive protection afforded by the Sherman Act. As well, the test will not unduly
punish legitimate petitioners, chill potential petitioners, or
waste valuable judicial resources.
Scott D. Helsel

